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Abstract
This Article examines South African perspectives on the legal system within South Africa
post-Apartheid, in particular the new focus on human rights.
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INTRODUCTION
On a recent visit to South Africa, I had occasion to talk to
various community leaders about the relevance of human
rights to a new post-apartheid legal order. The impression I
received from the few white South Africans I was able to meet
was extraordinarily positive. In contrast, the impression I received from talking to black South Africans was exactly the opposite. They saw a post-apartheid legal order in compliance
with human rights as, at best, something of a political hoax or,
worse, an elaborate fraud, generated by a ruling-class interest
in the preservation of economic and social privileges, historically allocated to white South Africa by naked expropriation,
plunder, and brute-force. From those with an articulate leftist
orientation, there was the additional charge that human rights
are essentially a ruling-class myth, designed to hijack fundamental structural changes in South Africa, changes that are the
only sure guarantee of a just society. Under this view, human
rights represent something like a false consciousness or a kind
of secular religion-a secular opiate of the masses. Human
rights are either irrelevant to the future South African legal
order or downright dangerous, in that they could be an impediment to the total eradication, not only of visible elements of
the apartheid state but of less visible "structural" forms of
power, which sustain the pattern of oppression and exploitation over time.
These impressions may be compared to perceptions South
Africans generally hold of the notion of law and legality itself.'
Since white South Africans, or at least the majority of them, are
prime beneficiaries of the apartheid legal order, their image of
law and its place in society and culture is generally a positive
one.- If, however, one is black, the image of the law may be
1. For an'introduction to the South African legal system and an examination of
the attitudes of both white and black South Africans toward the law, seeJ. DUGARD,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND TIE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER (1978); A.S. MATHEWS, FREEDOM, STATE SECURITY'AND THE RULE OF LAW:

(1986); A.S.

DILEMMAS OF THE APARTHEID SOCIETY

MATIEWS, LAW, ORDER AND LIBER-T IN SOUTH AFRICA

(1973).
2. See H.R. HAHLO & E. KAHN,
GROUND (1968) [hereinafter SOUTH

(1972); A.

SACHS,

JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA

THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL. SYSTEM AND ITS BACKAFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEMI

(general outline of tradi-
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negative. For blacks, law is an instrument of coercive oppression, and the image of legality and legalism is nothing but a
cold form attempting ineptly to provide a convenient mask for
brute, naked power. Law is simply power by another name.
Correspondingly, the relationship of law to justice may be seen
in the image that both law and justice are not only blind, they
are deaf and dumb.
I would describe these perspectives as the products of observation and conversation with a wide variety of "ordinary"
South Africans. The themes they represent would not be a
deep focal point of intellectual discussion in South Africa,
since, on the white side, with very few exceptions, the nature of
law is more an assumed datum than a continuous part of the
public debate about the nature of a just society.' South Africa's abstract, positivistic tradition virtually excludes from the
purview of legal education, legal scholarship, and the intellectual lines ofjurisprudential discourse such questions as the relationship of law to social process, the relationship of law to
the power processes and constitutional order, the nature of the
public order sustained by "law," the role of law in the promotion of human dignity, and solidarity with human kind from the
local to the global level. 4
From the perspective of the black community, there is
such an astonishing exclusion from the legal profession that
the alien nature of law permeates social and intellectual life at
almost all levels within the community. Black lawyers, the few
tion and history surrounding South African legal system); H.R.

HAHLO & E. KAHN,
SouTiH AFRICA: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND CONSTITUTION (1960) (examin-

ing system of law in South Africa). The important South African law journals have a
history of being notoriously uncritical of the theoretical and jurisprudential assumptions that underlie South African law. These journals include The South African Law
Journal, especially earlier volumes under the editorial aegis of Professor Hahlo. The
.AfrikaansJournal, Tvdskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg, founded by Dean
Pont of Pretoria and Fort Hare is another example. Modern scholars, a minority to
be sure, are challenging this. See J. DUGARD, supra note 1.
3. See generally SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 2 (emphasizing established nature of South African legal system).
4. See generallv Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Traing in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943) (outlining possible paths of reform in legal education); Reisman, Desigiiing Cticricula: laking Legal Educatioi Coitmuously Effective and Relevant for the 21st Ceitury, 17 CUMB. L. REX'. 831 (1986-87) (critiquing current state of legal education with substantive and structural suggestions for
change).
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of them that there are, practice on the margins of a legal order
that moves between humanitarian legal band-aid and crisis
management. All of this takes place in a legal game of "oneup"-the state always being the one-up. For these lawyers
"the life of the law," to misuse a famous Holmesian quotation,
is a "hell of an experience. '
This perspective is one that generates a high skepticism of
law and its relationship to freedom. Professor Gilmore seems
to echo this sentiment. In his now famous Storrs lecture he
stated that "the less just a society, the more law there will be;
the more just a society, the less law there would be." 6 "In
hell" he said, "all would be law, and due process would be meticulously observed." 7 Black South African lawyers have little
time to theorize about these larger questions. Their role in the
entire framework of South African legal culture presents a
level of marginality that is downright dangerous if it is representative of the pool of experience that is to manage legal culture in the post-apartheid period.

I. LA WAND THE UNJUST STATE
The perspectives I have tried to describe have generated
for me an interest in the problem of law in an unjust legal order-not a new or novel problem-and the relationship of this
issue to the possibilities for either the continuation of an unjust legal order or a new legal order for a more just South African society. My comments must, therefore, be speculative and
preliminary.
The nature of the legal order of an unjust state has been
well canvassed in Anglo-American legal literature.8 Those familiar with the literature of Anglo-American jurisprudence will
perhaps recall the famous Hart-Fuller debates of the late
1950s." To simplify the theme of those proceedings, Profes5. See OW. HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). "rhe actual quotation is:
"IT]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." Id.
6. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW iii (1977).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and M.lorals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593 (1958) (distinguishing law that is from law that ought to be); Fuller. Positivism and
FideliY to Lau---a Rep/v to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958) (stressing need
to recognize internal "morality of order" necessary to creation of all law).

9. See supra note 8.
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sors Hart and Fuller debated whether Nazi law really was
"law." Since some writers on the South African scene have
characterized the apartheid system as a South African reich,
the analogy to Nazi Germany and the Hart-Fuller problem
would appear to be compelling.'" Fuller, the conservative natural lawyer, had argued that law is in effect a complex of interacting moral systems and that a legal system such as that of
Nazi Germany, without even a minimal internal morality of
law, simply was a negation rather than an affirmation of the
idea of law and legality.1 '
Hart, from the perspective of modern analytical positivism, argued that although Nazi law was bad law, it was nonetheless law.' 2 This debate raised the question of whether a
moral minimum was an essential condition of law. The problem as applied to the South African legal order suggests an
obvious question: Is the law of the apartheid state so morally
decrepit as to represent a state of brute force masked occasionally in technical form? Or, is the law of the apartheid state bad
law, but law nonetheless?
Both these perspectives address the Anglo-American legal
heritage notion that law generally has an uneasy relationship
to power and that the overriding preponderance of coercion or
naked power in both the Nazi and apartheid systems undermines, weakens, or totally destroys the principle of legality. In
this view, law may have an affinity with power, but law is not
naked power and, conversely, naked power is not law.
I would suggest that the relationship of law to power is
one of the most important questions confronting a legal theorist concerned with the future of law in the post-apartheid
state. Since I would prefer to understand power in a realistic
sense, I may venture a conception of law that is correspondingly realistic: Law in any community is a process of decisionmaking that is both controlling (power) and authoritative (authority) whereby members of the community clarify and implement their common interests.'"
10. See generaU/h B. BUNTING: THEw RISE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REICH (1969)
(postulating existence of roots of a neo-Nazi drift in manner in which apartheid program was set in place).
11. Fuller, snpra note 8, at 650-54.
12. Hart, supa note 8, at 620.
13. For various discussions of the relationship of law to power, see generally
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Having forged this operational definition of what law isin a realistic, as distinct from a "formalistic" or "moralistic,"
sense-I want to briefly explore the problem of law and power
in the colonial state and the problems of the reception of the
colonial legal culture into the post-colonial state. Here I am
talking in terms of paradigms rather than actual states. I am,
of course, trying to distill a paradigm problem and then apply
its lessons to the South African legal scene.
II. POST-COLONIALISM AND THE SOUTI AFRICAN STATE

In many ways the apartheid state shares forms of governance characteristic of colonialism. The colonial state usually
inherited a legal culture based upon the legal culture of the
metropole but with crucial variations, variations that included
a coercive element substantially different from that which
would be permitted in the metropole itself. Some colonial societies simply had a dual-stream legal culture.' 4 They sometimes adopted, in an exaggerated manner, the forms, rituals,
and even apparel of the metropole, while simultaneously sustaining, sometimes in complex patterns of interdependence or
relative autonomy, a heavy emphasis on coercion and brute
International Law Essays: A Supplement to International Law in Contemporary Perspective (M. McDougal & W.M. Reisman eds. 1981) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAw
SUPI'PIEMENT] (collection of essays relating global constitutive process of authoritative
decisions to more comprehensive processes of effective power); M. McDouGAIL, H.
L.ASSWEL,, & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY (1980) [hereinafter HUMAN
RIGHrrs AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER] ("framework of inquiry" into human rights suggesting classification of such rights in a manner appropriate to world order); M. McDOUGAI. & W.M. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE: PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY (1981) (coursebook examining moral and intellectual responsibilities in international law); M. McDOUGAL & W.M. REISMAN,
POWER AND POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW (1985) (collection of essays examining relationship between power of law and its effects upon policy); W.M. REISMAN & A. SCHREIBER, JIRISPRUDENCE, UNDERSTANDINGS AND SHAPING LAW (1987) (collection of essays
examining relationship between power of law and its effect upon policy); W.M. REISMAN & B. WESTON, TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNIT (1976) (collection of
essays examining relationship between power of law and its effect upon policy).
14. See Address by Okoth-Ogendo, National Security in Kenya, the Preservation
of Public Security Act Uhurtu at the Whim of Government. given at Seminar on National Security and Human Rights (Feb. 12, 1987) [hereinafter Okoth-Ogendo Address I;seealso, C. )I. KIEWIE.T, THE IMPERI,. FACTOR IN SOUTH AFRICA (1966) (discussing effects of colonialization in South Africa): M. HOoxER, LEGAL PLURALISI: AN
INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAI, AND NEO-COILONIAL ILAWS (1975) (discussing effect of
colonialization in South Africa).
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force. 1" Indeed, in very many contexts, the law of the colonizer and the colonized was a brutal affair, with the colonizer
on the giving end and the colonized on the receiving end.'
"Law" here, by any standard of appraisal, was very much a coercive order, a matter of effective power. To be fully appreciated, this coercive order must be seen in the micro-details of
its operation, details that are frequently not observed by social
scientists, lawyers, or even economists. In most cases, the preemptive design of the colonial state in its infrastructural particulars, its administrative-bureaucratic processes, and its
processes for the administration ofjustice all evidence coercive
modalities of rule rationalized and made more efficient by advanced technologies of both coercion and administration.
What is perhaps partially obscured in this model is that in
many instances the resistance to colonialism made the nature
of the independent colonial state even more intensely coercive.' 7 This coercive structure was bequeathed to the newly
independent elites of many "new" nations. 8
Hidden in the euphoria of past independence celebrations
was the realization that the apparatus of state-the inheritance
of the prior regime-was a conception of public order based
less on authority, and more on power. Perhaps the signal
event that obscured this reality was the fact that grandiose constitutions were crafted, some after long and tortuous negotiations and dialogue, and were engrafted onto this post-colonial
state. The operative disjunction between constitutional ideals
and the inherited apparatus of the state, with its highly coercive characteristics, could not have provoked a more cynical
juxtaposition of hopes and ideals with power and pragmatics.
Something had to give. Dean Okoth-Ogendo of the University
of Nairobi describes the outcome in general terms: Constitutions without constitutional law.'
Since South Africa is rapidly coalescing around alternative
paradigms about its future, and since power-related outcomes
may be crucial to appreciate the nature of that future, it is appropriate to spell out the threshold practical problem. Since
15. See supia note 14.

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.

19. Okoth-Ogcndo Address, supra notc 14.
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the apparatus of state is in the hands of the Afrikaner elite, a
transfer of that state to a post-apartheid black government
would generate the transmittal of a highly centralized "garrison" state, with a massive apparatus of coercion and administration. Constitution-making may prescribe a new idealistic
legal agenda, which may simply., mask the operative reality of
law, power, and administration. In a context of insurrectionary
violence there is a serious question about what exactly of the
old legal order will survive. It should be recalled, however,
that the United States had a revolution and retained the common law as the law of the land-a system more in tune with
vested than revolutionary interests."' The French went one
better. They codified the existing Franco-Germanic-Roman
law.' Indeed, the revered Socialist Karl Renner argued that
legal forms are essentially neutral -depending on politics,
one can put either capitalist or socialist content into contract,
delict, and property.
With this background let us examine some core theoretical concerns about constitutionalism, power, and law and then
attempt to apply them to the post-apartheid legal order.
III. THEORETICAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE
PROBLEM OF POIVER
The basic technique of the comparative theorist is simplification. The mental tools of simplification are reductionism
and model-building. Social scientists who focus on the description of power in society have utilized a form of conceptual
reductionism effectively. Thus, theorists have argued that
South Africa's power relations are defined by race relations issues, by class relations, or, indeed, by the interactions of the
elite and non-elite.2 3 More recently, theories of pluralism and
20. l'he United States Constitution assumes the continued validity of the cornMon law in Article Ill: "The jUdicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity...." U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 21, cl.I. The seventh amendment preserves the
common law ilstittion of the jury trial: "ITihe right of trial by jury shall be preserved and no ftact tried by'jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any court.of the
United States. than according to the rules of the comnion law." Id. amend. VII.
21. See A. VoN MEItREN, TH: CIVIt.
L..xw SYSTEM 1-6 (1957); A GENERAL. SURVI.
OF CONTINE'NTA. LE;A. HISTORY 16-17 (NJ. Rothman Reprints 1912).
22. K. RE.NNER, THE INsrItUrIoNs OF PRIVATE LAw 2 (1949).
23. For discussion of the factors behind the political and social change that has
occurred within South African society in the 19th and 20th centuries, see R. PRICE &
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consociationalism have been used either descriptively and/or
prescriptively to describe or prescribe for the system of power
relations in that state. 24 A point of general concern in social
science is that descriptive concepts may frequently mask prescriptive preferences. Once the problem has been conceptually reduced to a relatively simple formula, models using salient features of the society under examination can be constructed.
The prime function of such theorizing is
explanation. The precise technique is simplification, although
the "good" models will have graduated levels of complexity,
until presumably the model as a model so simulates reality that
the two are practically indistinguishable. Perhaps the model
then ceases to be a model at all. Realities organized through
such a process become more accessible, possibly meaningful,
and, in extreme cases, even "rational."
In general social theory, two dominant concepts vie for
supremacy in the explanation of power relationships in any society. These concepts generate two distinct models. The first
model is that of consensus-collaboration. This model posits
that societies strive towards equilibrium and collaboration in
pursuit of common interests.2 5 This model has received strong
support from structural-functional social science. ' The second model is the model of conflict.2 7 This is a model inspired
C. ROSBERG, THE APARTHEID REGIME (1980) (general discussion of political and racial issues in modern South Africa); A. SAMPSON, BLACK & GOLD: IvCoONS, REVOLt:TIONARIES AND APARTHEID (1987) (emphasizing economic and social changes in
South Africa as being the result of race and class relations); HJ. SIMONS & R.E.
SIMONS, CLASS & COLOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA 1850-1950 (1969) (analyzing South African history as being the product of racial and class struggles); F.A. VAN JAARSVEI.D,
THE AWAKENING OF AFRIKANER NATIONALISM 1868-1881 (1961) (postulating how and

when Afrikaner nationalism arose, emphasizing the "birth of Afrikaner national consciousness" as a reaction to the "Imperial Factor" in South Africa); NAGAN. .Aerican
Polic ' , Southern Africa: The Stakes and the Stmce, in THE U.S. AND SOUTH AFRICA: THE
LIMITS OF "PEACEFUL CHANGE" (1978) (outlining United Stales's efforts in South Af-

rica and the ramifications of such efforts).
24. See L.J. BOULLE, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND APARTHEID 25-72 (1984) (de-

fining "pluralism" and "plural society" and seeking to illustrate theory of consociationalism by relating it to different traditions in political theory).
25. For a theoretical discussion of the origin and development of social classes,
see T. BOTOMORE, CLASSES IN MODERN SOCIETY 9 (1966).

26. Bottomore discusses how there is a high degree of social mobility between
the classes and that the classes seek to achieve similar goals. Id. at 57.

27. See T. HOBBES, IEVIATHAN (E.Rhys ed. 1914) (1655) (stating that classes
exist in conflict).
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by both the left and the right. On this issue each side has its
champions. The champion of the right is Hobbes, with his
modern successors such as George F. Will and William F.
Buckley. Those of the left are also well2 8- represented by such
figures as Karl Marx and his successors.
Both the consensus and the conflict theorists are concerned with explaining the nature of power in society. They
do this by using various strategies designed to frame or structure inquiry in such a manner as to frequently confirm their
own basic conceptual assumptions. To the consensus theorist,
social mobility undercuts class conflict. Elite circulation is usually conditioned by meritocracy and contains the potential for
social conflict. To the conflicts theorist, model building by social stratification is crucial for understanding conflict, especially class conflict. These models are useful in explaining the
nature of the South African power process and perhaps help us
as lawyers to clarify the conceptual underpinnings of the constitutional scheme we create, assume, or describe.
IV. THE RELEVANCE OF THE POJJER PROCESS TO
CONSTITUTIONAL LA [I'
Efforts to integrate conflict and consensus paradigms of
social process are rooted in the intuitive insight that in all
human interaction, one can discover patterns of both collaboration and conflict. The trick is to discover when people will
collaborate and when they will fight and, from a policy-making
standpoint, to prescribe the situations in which either conflict
or consensus is desirable. In other words, the control and regulation of collaboration and conflict, in the common interest,
poses a significant problem for law and for the conceptions of
law that one holds. If we accept the sociological idea that law
is a major-indeed massive-instrument of social control, then
the relationship of law to the process of effective power is an
entirely relevant datum to both theorist and practitioner.'9 If
28. See K. MARX, CAPITA. (Int'l Pub. 1967) (1864) (positing theorv of economically based classes antagonistic to one another-class conflict reflects the incompatibility of differing modes of production).
29. Seegeneral i ' H. LASSWELI, & A. KAPLAN, POWER ANI) SOCIETY (1950) (commentary on influences of different legal forces within society); M. McDoUCGA., TuE APPILICATION OF CONSTITUTIVE PRESCRIPTIONS:

AN ADI)ENDUM TOJusTICE CARDOZO (1978)

(discussing balancing of power in conjunction with the constitutive process and pro-
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the formal foundations of the process of effective power are
reflected in constitutive arrangements, the relevance of power
to constitutionalism would seem to be apparent.
I suspect that in its most basic sense, a constitution is not a
document fed by precedents about its scope and relevance. In
its most fundamental sense, a constitution is really a process by
which the basic power expectations of any community are institutionalized by understandings about appropriate allocations.
Indeed, these understandings ultimately may be codified in a
document or appropriate representative symbol. If it is true
that constitutions are decisional techniques by which societies
contain conflict between different power groups and alignments, conflict control must then be a major purpose of any
constitutive scheme. But the impetus to limit the cost of conflict through constitutional containment is not all. For the very
purpose of containment may lead to a recognition of broader
vistas of collaboration on matters of common advantage. I
would, therefore, suggest that both conflict and collaboration
are intrinsic to any constitutive process and are central features
of the conditions that sustain such processes.
V. CONFLICT-CONSENSUS, PLURALISM, AND THE
CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS
It has been fashionable to describe the political culture of
the United States as pluralist."" The reconciliation of pluralism with democracy is simple: Pure democracy is a theoretical
myth, not an operational reality. Pluralistic realities make democracy practically possible, hence the label "pluralistic democracy." Contemporary lawyers are concerned with the relevance and salience of theories about the basic institutions of
U.S. society. For example, the legal process jurisprudential
school bears a close affinity to theories of political pluralism
tection of individual human rights); HUMAN Rioirs AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, slip (l
note 13, at 161-307; INTERNATIONAL. LAW SUPLIEI:NT. StIpw(I note 13. at 1-14: R.
POUND. OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUI)ENCE (5th ed. 1943) (outlining authoritative precepts, techniques, and ideals of private law); Nagan. CiviI Process a1d Power:

Thoughisfiom a Polic)-Orieited Perspective, 39 U. F.A.1.. RE.'. 453 (1987).
30. For a general discussion of the political structure within the United States,
see R. DAHL, MODERN POLrIICAL ANALYSIS (1963) (discussing how democratic society
is composed of numerous subsystems); D. NIMMO & T. UNGS, AMERIC:N POLrrICAI.
PA°I'ERNS: CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS (3d ed. 1973) (general discussion of democracy

and composition of different political systems).
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and even views law as a neutral, yet principled, back-bone of a
kind of political pluralism.
Indeed, the theory that underlies
the modern form of the U.S. Constitution, in the opinion of
many mainline theorists, is political pluralism.3 2 It is unclear
whether historically, the Constitution is a consequence or a
condition of pluralism or, indeed, whether the complex alliances of interest groups and individuals can be fairly described
as pluralistic in the sense that the term is used today. Theories
of pluralism compliment the conflict theory of social organization, and it is argued that the experience of segmented societies sometimes generated special versions of pluralism.", Indeed, social theory suggests that there are three distinct variations of pluralism, 34 not all of which are compatible with
democratic ideals. First, there is conflict-pluralism,3 5 which
may result in a single group dominating other groups. Second, there is consensual-pluralism, 36 in which cultural differences are minimized by high social mobility, in which individuals frequently enjoy multiple group affiliations. The third
model is consociational pluralism. 7 This model is the one that
31. See H.

WECHSLER, TOWARD NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN

PRINCIPLES, POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW

27 (1961) (discussing how the courts of

law must be entirely principled. The law is a "principled decision . . . one that rests

on . . . reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate
result that is involved."); see also R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSL- vii (1978);
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, snpra note 13, at i; Nagan, Conflicts Theory
in Conflict. .4 Systenatic,-Ippraisalof Traditional and Conteniporarv Theories, 3 N.Y.L. ScrI.J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 343, 472 n.331 (1982). Seegenerally H. HART & S. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS, BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW

(1958) (collec-

tion of essays on study of law as functional process, focusing upon institutions
through which law is expressed).
32. See R. DAHL, supra note 30, at 9-10; S. MONSMA. AMERICAN POLITICS 51
(1969). Dahl states that a "' 'democratic' society properly describes a social system
that not only has democratic political (sub)systems btt also a number of other stibsystems that operate so as to contribute directly or indirectly to the strength of the
democratic political processes." Id.
33. In discussing the formation of the U.S. Constitution, Monsma emphasizes
that it was "the product of political struggles and conflicts among contending
forces." S. MONSMA, s.0pra note 32, at 51-52. See generall) D. NIMMO & T. UNGS, Supra
note 30.
34. See A. LIJPHART, THE POLITICS OF ACCOMODATION 1 (1968).
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id. at 5.
37. See L.J. BOULLE, stnpra note 24, at 25; Daalder. The Consociational Democracy
Theme, 26 WORLD POL. 604 (1974). See generalv Lijphart, Cosociational Democracy, 21
WORLD Po.. 207 (1969). The two key themes in the notion of consociational democracy are (I) group dynamics and (2) allocation of power. The idea incorporates prob-
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Afrikaner intellectuals urge has promise for South Africa. This
form of pluralism suggests a highly segmented society (perhaps extensively segmented) in which a high degree of cooperation exists at the elite level of social process. The Afrikaner
philosopher Degenaar suggests that " '[t]he present situation
ably all of the following: "vertical pluralism," "segmented pluralism," "social fragmentation," "ideological compartmentalization," pillarization, and more. Daalder,
supra, at 606. The model of consociational democracy tends to "show a curious mixture of ideological intransigence on the one hand and pragmatic political bargaining
on the other. Separatism makes for a dogmatic, expressive style of politics within
ideological families. But relations among subcultures are settled by a process of
careful and businesslike adjustments." Id. at 607. See generally L. POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW: A COMPARATIVE THEORY (1971) (analyzing substantive law of different legal systems across cultural lines). Daalder continues:
[C]onsociational democracy tends to have an extensive network of functional organizations within ideological families, which allows a means of
controlled representation for special interests. The prevalance of myriad
ideological organizations is therefore not necessarily a sign of impending
battle. Rather, it provides the organizational infrastructure on which elites
can operate in an atmosphere of discretionary freedom, coupled with a fair
guarantee of consensus. In the view of some authors, such ideologically
separate groups also help to minimize opportunities of conflict: "good social fences," in Lijphart's words, "may make good political neighbors."
Daalder, supra, at 608.
A major weakness in the typological model of consociational democracy is its
reticence on why and how such consociational systems develop. Major exponents of
its development have included such scholars as Arend Lijphart. See A. LUPHART, slipra
note 34. The most refined answer is proffered in HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER, supra note 13; see also, Kaplan, Balance of Power, Bipolarit' and Olher Vodels of
InteniationalSystems, 51 AM. POL. Sex. REV. 684 (1957); McDougal, Willard & Reisman,
The llorild Process of Effective Power, in INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT, supra note 13,
at 357. Kaplan notes that within the structure of the international system,
functional lines of organization are stronger than geographical lines ....
Functional cross-cutting makes it most difficult to organize successfully
against the international system or to withdraw from it. Even if the constitution of the system were to permit such withdrawal, the integration of facilities over time would raise the costs of withdrawal too high.
Kaplan, supra, at 694.
In his discussion of the subject, Pospisil's basic thesis is that "every functioning
subgroup of a society has its own legal system which is necessarily different in some
respects from those of the other subgroups." Pospisil. Legal Levels aid hltiplicit' of
Legal Systems in Himiai Societies, II J. CONFLICT RISOtUTION 2, 9 (1967). Pospisil concludes in this regard as follows:
Consequently, law in a given society differs among groups of the same inclusiveness (within the same legal level); thus different laws are applied to different individuals. Law also exhibits discrepencies between legal systems of
subgroups of different inclusiveness (between different legal levels), with
the consequence that the same individuals may be subject to several legal
systems different in the content of their law to the point of contradiction.
Id. at 9.
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can be described in terms of conflict pluralism with a possible
development in the direction of consociational pluralism which
could be the stage of transition towards a fully-fledged consensus pluralism .
*...' "8
This perspective builds upon a conception of South Africa's power and constitutive process as seen essentially
through the prism of white hegemony. One will appreciate the
inherent difficulty of adequately describing the complex power
realities of South Africa in terms of general abstractions like
"conflict," "consent," or "pluralism."
I would suggest that the South African power process, for
the purpose of the kind of understanding that is attempted
here, might require an approach that is more radically contextual, such as the general outlines of the processes of effective
power pioneered in the classic expositions of Lasswell and
Kaplan, Lasswell and McDougal, and others associated with
the policy-sciences 9 A radically contextual view of the
processes of effective power would ask a range of questions
perhaps obscured by some of the more conventional frames of
reference. Such questions include: who are the power-conditioned actors; what are their perspectives of identity, demand,
and expectation; what bases of power are at their disposal;
what strategies of power do they have access to (diplomatic,
ideological, economic, military); in what situations do they interact (geographic, temporal, institutional, crisis, etc.); and
with what results and effects? Such a perspective about power
may enable us to explore and observe the South African power
process without a rigid fixation either on the institution of
white power exclusively or on examining power relations
purely through the prism of the state. Indeed, such a focus
may enable the observer to see more explicitly the dynamics of
black power. It cannot be gainsaid that black culture is inert,
on the contrary, it is a vigorous, power-generating, norm-creating community, which generates an alternative frame of expectations about law, legal culture, and most importantly,
about constitutive process. Let us, therefore, assay some of
38. L.J. BOULLE, sura note 24, at 37 (quoting Degenaar. Pluralism and the Plural
Society, in THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF SoUTii AFRICA 238 (19.78)).

39. See supra note 29.
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the dominant elements of the complex South African power
process.
VI. CHANVGES IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN POTVER PROCESS
AS INDICATORS OF A TREND TOWARDS AA
ALTERNATIVE LEGAL ORDER
The crisis that presently exists in South Africa seems more
serious than the events that occurred in Sharpville in 1960 and
Soweto in 1976-77.4o Power relationships within all segments
of society are in the midst of change. There are four factors
that are central to understanding the race and power dynamics
of South Africa:
(1) the extent of the political mobilization of blacks under
the umbrella of the United Democratic Front [the "UDF"];
(2) the emerging attitude in various sectors of the white
community (including the Afrikaners) that the African National Congress [the "ANC"] is a force to be reckoned and
spoken with; (3) the tangible effects of international sanctions on the South African economy; and (4) the position of
influence and legitimacy of the ANC inside and outside
South Africa. 4"
VII. THE SOUTH AFRICAN' POWER PROCESSES
The most important power-conditioned occurrence within
40. See Address by Winston Nagan, in

PROCEEDINGS,

EIGHTIETH ANNUAl. MEET-

320-22 (Apr. 9-12, 1986) [hereinafter Nagan Address]. In Soweto in late 1976 and 1977 numerous riots took place,
many of which were initiated by students protesting government decrees on educational policies. See South .African Police Use Tear Gas to Quell Soweto Student Protest, NN.
Times, Feb. 10, 1977, at A3, col. 1. In Sharpville similar rioting occurred in 1960. In
one particular incident, 56 persons were killed and 162 were wounded after police
opened fire on a crowd of 20,000 that had surrounded a local police station. See The
Tragedy at Shapville, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1960, at A36. col. 1. For discussions of the
economic and political changes that have occured within South Africa, see luternal
Political Situation in South Africa: Heariiigs Before the Subcowini. oi .Africa of the Copw,. on
Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); The Possibility of a Resource IIar iii Southeri
Africa: Hearings Before the Subcoiim. oii Africa of the Comm. oii Foreign .- lfairs, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981); COMMONWEALTlI GROUI OF EMINFNT PERSONS, MISSION to SOuTtI
AFRICA: THE COMMONWEALTH REPORT (1986); K. (;RUNI)Y, THE MILITARIZATION OF
SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS (1986); M. MBEKI, PROFII.E OF PoI.iTiCAL CONFICTS IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA (1987); SOUTH-ERN AFRICA IN CRISIS (C. Carter & P. O'Meara ed.
1977); Nagan, An .-Ippraisal of/lhe Compreheisi,e .Iti-.4partheid.-lct of 1986, 5,1.1.. & REI.IGION 327 (1987).
41. Nagan Address. stipra note 40. at 320-21.
ING, THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

414 FORDHAM LVTERNATIONAL LA WJOURAAL [Vol. 12:399
South Africa has been the extent of black political mobilization,4 2- specifically the growing strength of the ANC, the UDF,
and the trade unions.4 3 In spite of the government's attempts
to eliminate it, 44 the UDF remains an influential force within
South Africa. While the UDF has not sought to use the violent
techniques practiced by the ANC,4 5 it shares the same objectives.
The ANC, with itsunion support, is the most prominent
organization seeking to influence the formation of a new South
African government. 46 If the ANC were legalized and operational, observers predict the UDF effectively would be absorbed into the ANC.4 7 In sum, effective mobilization under
the umbrella of the UDF and the trade unions promises
changes in the black power pi'ocess and solidarity with the
ANC.
A second noteworthy change within South Africa has been
the fragmentation of politics within the white community. Vast
changes have occurred in business, educational, and religious
structures within society.4 8 In spite of the fact that it has been
labeled as a terrorist group by the government, the ANC has
established significant contacts in all three of these areas.
The ANC has sought to solidify its power base within society
by maintaining both coercive and negotiating strategies in
hopes that such tactics will further isolate President Botha's
wing of the nationalist party while at the same time increasing
42. Id. at 321.
43. Id. It was not until late 1970 that black unions were given the same rights to
bargain and strike as white unions. R. SINCERE, THE POLI[CS OF SEN'rIMENNT 79
(1984). Due to this, the impact of the black union movement isjust beginning to be
felt. Id. The UDF was formed in response to the 1983 Constitution. Id. at 3. Hence.
its impact upon events in South Africa is also comparatively recent.
44. See Cowell, South Africa Puts 16 Blacks on Trial in a Treason Case, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 6, 1985, at AI, col. 4 (16 UDF leaders placed on trial).
45. Id. Unlike the UDF, since the early 1960s, the ANC has claimed responsibilityfor numerous terrorist attacks. R. SINCERE, s1pra unote
43, at 21.
46. See generaly Cowell, Lesotho Expels 60 South .African Insurgents, N.Y. Times, Jan.
26, 1986, at A6, col. 1;Gwertzman, 1.S. .Ask Inclusion of .landela Group to Pretoria Talks.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1985, at Al, col. 4 (emphasizing prominence of ANC within
South Africa).
47. See supra note 46; seealso Nagan Address, supra note 40, at 320-21.
48. See Nagan Address, supra note 40. at 321. For a commentary on the social.
economic, and religious changes that have taken place within South Africa, see R.
SINCERE, supra note 43.
49. R. SINCERE, sHIpra note 43.
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ANC exposure:
It may also be observed that the acts that consolidated and
formalized black urban ghettos (townships), 5 and the fragmentation of South Africa in line with the policies of statal
"Bantustan" apartheid, 52 have also sown the seeds for pockets
of black autonomy from day to day white control-white administration. One of the key points of conflict in the ghettos
and townships is the spontaneous development of alternate
community structures that are culturally representative of
black rather than white expectations of governance. The coercive side of these developments (apart from state repression
and reaction) have meant that it is almost impossible to secure
the physical integrity of black state functionaries in the townships.
The above mentioned data reflect in only the most cursory
manner the complex trends in the disposition of power-especially informal power in South Africa-but they enable us to
suggest a tentative hypothesis: Black South Africa and white
South Africa over time generate power outcomes that may suggest a normative order for both blacks and whites that,
although frequently interdependent and sometimes even interdetermining, can sometimes be seen as relatively discrete. The
dynamics of white power have been closely assayed in many
eminent works. 53 Its processes of norm creation have been an
almost axiomatic product of those researches. But the business of norm creation among blacks remains an understudied
matter for reasons probably too numerous to mention here.
VIII. PRESCRIPTION AS A NORM-GENERA TING PROCESS
Let us examine the business of norm-creating activity with
a mildly heretical notion. Let us suppose that the apartheid
state represents largely the "formal" law of the land. Let us
assume, however, that South Africa and its complex, discrete,
and interlocking power arrangements constitute a living, vigorous, norm-creating system. Let us further hypothesize that
50. See Nagan Address, supra note 40, at 321.

51. See J.

supra note 1, at 80.

DUGARD,

52. Id. at 188.
53. Id; see, e.g., R.

LEONARD, 8oUTtl AFRICA AT WAR: WHITE POWER AND THE CRI-

SIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
VUUREN,

SoUTII AFRICA:

(1983); R. PRICE & C. ROSBERG, supra note 23; D.J.
A PLURAL. SOCIETY IN TRANSITION (1985).

VAN
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while there are such things as laws on the books, there is also

such a phenomenon as the "living law"-a kind of law-making,
norm-generating process arising out of actual behavior, a process that produces expectations sometimes inconsistent with
the formal law, the official myth of apartheid law.
Perhaps we might examine the roots of this development
in terms of such matters as the delegitimizing of the law of the

ruling group, a practice inaugurated by Gandhi prior to the
Great War and continued through the campaigns against unjust laws and the resistance to "law" internally and externally
at complex levels of social, political, and interpersonal interaction. Let us look at such efforts as the Unity Movement Ten
Point Program," The Freedom Charter,5 5 the UDF Declaration, 5" and more recently the update of the Freedom Charter

of 1988,'5 not so much as "law" in any formalistic sense, but as
outcomes of the discrete black power process and as codifications of norm-creating activity of those actors and institutions

opposed to the apartheid legal order. 58 Perhaps we might go
54. See generallY HJ. SIMONS & R.E. SIMONS, supra note 23.
55. THE FREEDOM CHARTER OF SOUTH AFRICA (U.N. Center Centre Against
Apartheid pub. 1979), reprinted infra, appendix A.
56. UDF Declaration, reprinted infra, appendix B.
57. Freedom Charter-1988 version [hereinafter Charter 88], in AAC's PostApartheid 'Guidelines" '4-, Front File, Aug. 1988, at 1 [hereinafter Front File], reprinted infa, appendix C.
58. Two thoughtful essays that explore South African black constitutional expectations are Dlova, Towards a Aon-Racial Majoritarianand Quasi-federal Constitution in
Soutlh Africa, 3 LESOTHO L.J. 117 (1987) and Pheko, Constitutional Reconstruction of South
.IJiica, 3 LEsoTHo L.J. 145 (1987). Dlova's paper underlines the differences between
the ANC and the Pan Africanist Conference ("PAC") perspectives regarding the status of whites and other minorities under an ANC or PAC dominated regime. Perhaps
the most important difference lies in the "charterists" versus "Africanist" symbology.
Charterists are essentially progressive democrats. They are non-racial; whites and
other minorities are clearly included in the definition of who is a South African. Africanists are inclined to be more ethnically exclusive about South African or "Azanian"
identity. Dlova, supra, at 120-22. In the context of the Freedom Charter, Dlova
points out that the Charter firmly stipulates a commitment to universal franchise and
a non-racial democracy. On the structural configuration of a post-apartheid South
Africa, federal-type ideas are present in the Freedom Charter, since the Charter
promises a guarantee of equal rights for all national groups. The territorial and ethnographic implications of'this guarantee are unclear. The problem of a one-party
versus a multiparty state is also problematic, because South Africa's diversity stratifies the power process. A multiparty system max, be necessitated by the conditions of
effective power. Again the Charter guarantees the prospect of freedom of association. A multiparty constitutional arrangement in a post-apartheid society is certainly
consistent, possibly even mandated, by the Freedom Charter. Set, Freedom Charter.
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beyond the heretical and suggest that in South Africa, incipient
legal expectations among the oppressed are already a part of
the legal landscape. The way to make sense of these expectations, norm-generating communications, is perhaps to borrow
from the model of classical communications theory:
Who?
Says What?
About What?
Through What Channel?
To Whom?
With What Result?
With What Effects? 59
And perhaps the most adventurous idea of all: Let us use this
model to approximate the making of the living law of black
South Africa. Such a model would contain the following elements:
Target Audience
Communicators

Authority Signal }
Control Intention

Policy Content"

The instruments identified and the particular activities specified are by no means exclusive indicia of what we are attempting to describe. However, we have tried to suggest that there
is symbolic importance to those instruments in a double sense.
supra note 55, repriited infra, appendix A. Portions of the Freedom Charter do, at
least in form, resemble expectations codified in constitutions that honor a bill of
rights. Id. However, recent human rights developments make the Charter somewhat
out-of-date in the field of human rights, regional or universal.
59. Reisman, InternationalLawmaking: A Process of Comminication, in AM. Soc'Y OF
INT'. L., PROCEEDINGS OF THE 75TH ANNUAL MEETING 101 (1981). Reisman emphasizes that in 1948 Lasswell formulated this series of questions. These questions provide the means by which one can understand how "lawmaking or the prescribing of
policy as authoritative for a community is a process of communication." Id. at 105.
60. See id. Using similar language, Reisman discusses how
"control analysis" focuses on the Who, the communicators. "Content
analysis" focuses on the What. Those who look primarily, at the institutions
specialized to print, as audio or visual communications, the channels of
communication, we are engaged in "Media Analysis." "Atdience Analysis"
focuses oi the Whom and "Effects Analysis" focuses on the personal and
social consequences of a flow of communications. Ideally, all these types of
analysis should be studied in ensemble, but any one provides a useful
window of the process.
Id. at 106.
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First, they symbolize the alternative possibilities of a different
legal and social process. Second, they are important symbols
of the struggle itself. Unfortunately, the instruments, of necessity, are also more a product of a reaction to the apartheid
state. From this point of view, a critical content analysis would
seem to undercut the authority these instruments symbolize.
And yet, with or without a critical assessment, these instruments may indeed be the future blueprint of the new legal order. And, like some predecessor examples, they may form a
kind of constitutional blueprint without practical significance.
For those South Africans who believe in liberation but do
not believe in human rights, let us start with the language of
the Freedom Charter for illustration: The Charter says that
"[a]ll national groups shall have equal human rights!"'" The
rights recognized under this heading are a very small cluster of
the rights that are recognized today as "human rights" and a
tiny cluster of those promoted in the Third World. In fairness,
the instrument contains many other provisions that, although
not designated as human rights, are clearly human rights. Let
us examine this trend more systematically.
IX. TRENDS IV CONS TITUTIVE EXPECTATIONS ABOUT
LIBERATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
IN SOUTH AFRICA
A. The Atlantic Charter
The idea of fundamental law in a post-apartheid society
will in some degree be influenced by the perspective of blacks
about the nature of law and constitutionalism. The idea of law
will probably be conditioned also by international expectations
of the modern era. These expectations are capsuled in contemporary international law, which include human rights standards, as well as peremptory standards of ius cogens. It may be
surprising to some that black expectations about a future dispensation of "African claims" have been indelibly influenced
by World War II and the allied instrument of codified war
aims, the Atlantic Charter.132 The ANC Annual Conference of
December 16, 1943, contains a document entitled "Africans'
61. Freedom Charter, supra note 55, reprinled infra, appendix A.
62. joini declaration of the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, 5 DEi r S'T. BuLL,, 125 (194 1).
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Claims in South Africa, Including 'The Atlantic Charter from
the Standpoint of the Africans Within the Union of South Africa.' "
This document is not only a codification of black demands, it is also a document that places those demands within
the framework of allied war aims-that is to say, within an international context, making those demands a matter of international concern.
In the preface to this document, Dr. A.B. Xuma, President-General of the ANC and the Secretary-Organizer of the
Atlantic Charter Committee, South Africa, noted that there
were differences in the interpretation of the Charter."4 According to Xuma, President Roosevelt envisioned that the
Charter would apply to the "whole world," whereas Winston
Churchill was thought to have held the view that it only applied
to "the white people of occupied Europe. ' 6 5 Xuma then made
the following statement:
We urge that if fascism and fascist tendencies are to be uprooted from the face of the earth, and to open the way for
peace, prosperity and racial good-will, the "Atlantic Charter" must apply to the whole British Empire, the United
States of America and to all the nations of the world and
their subject peoples. And we urge that South Africa ...
must grant the just claims of her non-European peoples to
freedom, democracy and6 6human decency, as contained in
the following document.
The primary document is entitled "The Atlantic Charter and
the Africans." "' 7 It is there noted that Field-Marshal Smuts, the
South African Prime Minister, endorsed the Charter on behalf
of South Africa." The document also notes that the "Honorable" Deneys Reitz, representing the South African government
in a speech to "the African people," indicated that "the Freedoms vouchsafed to the peoples of the world in the Atlantic
63. The ./alnic Char/erfiom the Stadpoint of ;lJricans ithin the n "ion o/ Sonh .-trica.
rprinted in 2 G. CARTER & T. KARIS. FROM PROTEST TO CIIAIJENGE: DOCUMENTS OF
Ai.RICAN PoL.ITics IN SotuTii AFRICA\ 1881-1964. at 209-23 (1972) [hereinafter FROM
PROTESI rO (II.LIENGE].
64. Id., reprinted in FROM PROTIST 1TOCIHAILENGF, inpr, note 63, at 209-11.
65. Id.. reprined in I"ROM PROTEST TO CHAL.NGE. supri note 63. at 209.

66. Id., replited in F"ROM PROTEST TO

CHALLEGEN;.

sp
in

note 63. at 209-10.

67. Id., reprited in FROM PROVEST TO CHALLE;NE, sinpra note 63. at 211.

68. Id.
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Charter were indicated for the African people as well. ' '
The document then gives the African interpretation of the
Atlantic Charter covering the subjects of (i) aggrandizement;
(ii) territorial changes-interpreted in terms of self-determination; (iii) the right to "choose" the form of government-again
interpreted in terms of self-determination; (iv) an open-door
policy on trade and raw materials; (v) economic issues including labor rights; (vi) defeat of Nazi tyranny; (vii) freedom of the
seas; (viii) abandonment of the use of force; and finally, (ix) the
Bill of Rights.7 °
The Bill of Rights section is itself a comprehensive document covering both civil and political rights as well as cultural
and economic rights. 7 Although these rights are not as comprehensively or systematically developed as modern human
rights instruments permit, they represent a precocious anticipation of a larger and more comprehensive agenda of fundamental human rights. The document covers the following demands, which are then set out in detailed sub-categories: (i)
full citizenship rights and demands, (ii) land, (iii) industry and
labor, (iv) commerce, '(v) education, (vi) public health and
medical services, and (vii) discriminatory legislation.7 2 It is unclear whether any of these claims were in fact submitted to the
peace conference. While the "African claims" inspired by the
Atlantic Charter found no international support among the
victorious allied powers, they were an important symbol of
black aspirations and, together with the Atlantic Charter, a further symbol of the legitimacy of those aspirations. These
claims were also the core inspiration for the Congress of the
people in Kliptown in 1955 where the ANC's Freedom Charter
was adopted.7
69. Id.; seealso Laurence. Apatheid Foes lVow to Fight failJor Black Leaders Convicted
q/'rpaso,. Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 21, 1988, at 12, col. 1;Lekota. From a Pretoria
Jail. a Phca to Blacks. N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1988. at A23, col. 3 (insisting that light
against racism must be fought "from both sides of the color line" and urging reconciliation with whitcs).
70. Sec 2 G. ('wrn.it & T. KARis, sui a note 63, at 213-22.
71. Sreid. at 217-22.
72. Id.
73. Se Front File, supra note 57, at 1.
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B. The Freedom Charter (1955)
The Freedom Charter of 1955 (the "Charter") proclaims
in its preamble that South Africa "belongs to all who live in it";
that the only legitimate basis of governance is one whose "authority" rests on the "will of all the people." 7 4 The Charter
notes that the white government is one founded upon "injustice" and "inequality," and the development of "equal rights
and opportunities ' 7 5 are the major expectations of South Africa's black majority. The preamble portion of the Charter
concludes with an express commitment to a "democratic
state.'' 7"
The substantive aspect of the Charter covers such issues
as governance ("The people shall govern!"), which includes
civil and political rights, such as the universal franchise, rights
of "national" groups, and economic rights and expectations,
under titles such as "The people shall share . . .in the country's wealth" and "The land shall be shared among those who
work it." 77 The principle of non-discrimination appears in various positive and negative guises in the document, including a
section titled: "All shall be equal before the law," a section
that sets out principles of fair trials and humane standards in
the administration of justice, including the revolutionary idea
that punishment in the criminal justice system should aim at
7
"re-education" rather than "vengeance.
The Charter also focuses on matters of economic security
in the form of principles to govern labor relations; matters of
education and culture; rights to housing, medical care, decent
living conditions, recreation, and leisure.7 ' Finally, the Charter makes an explicit commitment to human rights: "All national groups have equal human rights!"""1 Under the label of
human rights, the Charter maintains that' the law guarantees
"rights to speak, to organise, to meet together .... ,,i1 These
rights may have been meant to include what is conventionally
74.
75.
76.
77.

Frecdom Charter, supra note 55. reprinted
Id.
Id.
Id.

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.

if , appendix A.
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meant, perhaps more broadly, as freedom of expression and
the freedom of association .12 The reference that the law guarantee the "right to punish" in this same paragraph is unclear
unless it is with reference to children, which is the last word in
the sentence: "The law shall guarantee to all their rights to
speak, to organise, co meet together, to punish, to preach, to
worship and to educate their children.""s The sentence also
includes what conventionally might fall under freedom of belief and conscience as well as the education of children. Additionally, the human rights provisions include references to a
narrow conception of privacy, the right to travel, and the aboli-

tion of pass laws.8 4
The Charter finally and importantly makes an explicit
commitment to promote international peace and security as
well as the principles of international friendly relations and cooperation. 5
The Freedom Charter was adopted unanimously by a
"Congress of the People" held in Kliptown (near Johannesburg) on June 25-26, 1955.8 The Congress was convened by
the Congress alliance, 7 with the African National Congress
playing the lead role."' The other congresses that were fully
represented were the South African Indian Congress, founded
in the late nineteenth century by Gandhi, the South African
Coloured Peoples Organization, and the Congress of Democrats (a white group supporting liberation)."" The Kliptown
Congress of the People was attended by some 2888 delegates
of all races and all geographic regions of South Africa." This
document notes that the Freedom Charter of South Africa became a "manifesto" of the freedom struggle."'
In the year following the Charter's adoption, Pretoria authorities arrested 156 leaders (of all racial groups) of the Con82. Id.

8 3. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.

89. l.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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gress movement and tried them for high treason.'92 The defendants were acquitted after over four years of legal proceedings. In the early sixties, the ANC and the Congress of
Democrats were banned outright, and the other elements of
the Congress alliance were demolished along with political repression of its leadership.
The Charter is both a statement of principle, codifying
black expectations about a post-apartheid South Africa, and a
key symbol of struggle. These are essentially the same qualities that moved the Allies to proclaim the Atlantic Charter during the early and dark years of World War II.
The Charter commits the "liberation" forces to a democratic South Africa: It uses as the core index of authority and
legitimacy "all" the people of South Africa, because it is "we
the people of South Africa, black and white together-equals,
countrymen and brothers" who adopt the Charter.9"
The Charter codifies both civil and political rights of individuals and of all "national groups." 9 4 The document articulates some kinds of "group" rights, but does not exhaustively
assay in detail the full range of possible points of conflict between group and individual rights or the character of the allocation of authority for the resolution of points of friction.
Given the fact that proposals of several white constitutional
scholars have assayed the potential relevance of variants of federal-consociational models for a post-apartheid society, the
recognition of both group and individual civil, political, and
cultural rights raises questions about the perpetuation of
group or racial identities in a post-apartheid order. As a legitimate constitutional goal, how is one to distinguish coherently
between a color-blind, "group blind" society on the one hand,
and a vigorous and exciting diversification of culture and society on the other?
Within this framework, the idea of the rule of law seems to
be an assumed datum rather than a conscious and explicit policy design of the Charter. However, we cali clearly see the influence of the rule of law idea in the fair trial and administrative arbitrariness provisions. However, there are good reasons
92. See Laurence, supra note 69, at 12, col. 1.
93. Freedom Charter, snpra note 55, reprinted i!/ra, appendix A.
94. Id.
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for a measure of ambivalence or ambiguity. In the South African context, "unjust laws," even in the 1950s, were an integral
part of the political landscape, and because law was an indispensable part of the repressive apparatus of state, the idea of
equating the rule of law with the rule of freedom and liberation
was and remains a difficult proposition. Moreover, the repressive apparatus of law was managed by those who were most
responsible for repression. The concept of law in an alternative vision, however difficult, is still an important element of
Charter expectations.
In the economic sphere, the Charter endorses the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, many
years before it became the cornerstone of international economic "soft" law and a key element in the New International
Economic Order (the "NIEO"). 9 5 The economic provisions of
the Charter refer to the "mineral wealth," the banking industry, and "monopoly industry" being transferred to "the people
as a whole,'"'" which probably means that the charterists envisioned the nationalization of large-scale economic enterprises.
This suggests that the Charter was a socialist-leaning document. We say socialist-leaning because the Charter says that
"all other industry" will be subject to controls to secure the
well-being of the people. ' )7 This implies a private sector as
well. Moreover, the Charter contains the complementary prinhave the right, inter alia, to "trade" and
ciple that all people
"manufacture.'" 8 The labor-rights provisions codify the right
to collective bargaining and the principle that the state should
honor the right to work. These references imply a directive
both at state and private industry. It may also have been an
implicit economic assumption of the Charter that socialization
of key elements of the economy would enable the state, in the
future, to bankroll the promise of a welfare state. In many respects these provisions of the Charter seem to resemble the
Swedish model of the welfare state.""
95. For an explanation and analysis of the NIEO, see E. IASZLO, iHE 0),,cNEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORIDER (1978).
96. See Freedom Charter, supra note 55. re[inin/ed ih/ia, appendix A.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. For a general discussion of the Swedish welfare state, see SWEDI'N-I-MITrS
TI WELFARE STATEr: CRITI.Cl, REVIrWS IN P1OST- AR SWEDEN (). Krev ed. 1979).
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Finally, the references to human rights and international
peace and security clearly indicate the commitment of a postapartheid regime to both the direct historical heritage of the
Atlantic Charter and, more importantly, to an identification
with the policies, purposes, and principles of the United Nations Charter system." °° Indeed, the Freedom Charter commits itself to a form of authority identified with the major purposes of the U.N. and may be contrasted with the apartheid
regime, which symbolizes the exact opposite. Judged by 1989
standards, the Charter may be a bit creaky. The anti-human
rights epidemic of torture, extra judicial executions, and the
untold number of detainees-prisoners of conscience-have
made the international rule of law an indispensible element of
a just society.
The sophistication and sheer breadth of the comprehensive view of what human rights make the Charter's human
rights provisions, even when read in light of other entitlements
that the Charter does not designate as human rights, seem
rather grudging. The socialization of the means of production
as a short-cut to an economy of fairness and abundance has
been the focus of controversy, and in some cases retreat, in the
countries that promoted these ideas as universal truths. Still,
the document is an important and updated instrument of the
African claims formulated after the proclamation of the Atlantic Charter. And in its own historic context it is a precocious
and far-sighted symbol of liberation.
C. Tme L'DF Declaratiou
As
the
apartheid
plan
envisioned
by
the
Verwoerd/Vorster wing of the National party, became patently
unworkable in the light of the Soweto insurrection of 1976, the
elites of the party were confronted with an adapt-or-die crisis.
One of the core outcomes of this crisis was the formulation of a
neo-apartheid strategy built around a new constitutional dispensation.'"' It is beyond the scope of this paper to outline
100. Compare Freedom Charter. supro note 55, ieprinled infio, appendix A wi/h
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (primary goal of United Nations is the settlement of
disputes through peaceful means).
101. REP. OF S. AFR. CONs'i. AcT 110 oi 1983, Proc. 119 GG 9308. For an analysis of the new South African Constitution, see Note, Tle Repiblic o/'Souh .1/ica Consii11ioii .lcI 110 (?/' 1983, 9 S. AFR. Y.B. INT)I. 1.. 96 (1983).
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the key elements of the new dispensation. It may be sufficient
to say, however, that it created a tri-cameral parliament composed of whites, indians, and coloureds, with the whites being
the unassailable majority. 12 Power was concentrated in the
state president who could and did invoke a near permanent
rule by state of emergency. This constitution completely excluded blacks from its power dispensation.'0 3 With the ANC
and the Pan Africanist Congress (the "PAC") banned and unlawful in South Africa, black South Africans began to reorganize resistance under the umbrella of the UDF. In 1983, in the
Rocklands Civic Center, Mitchell's Plain, South Africa, the assembled conference of delegates of civic, labor, sports, educational, and community organizations from all over South Africa reaffirmed the principle of a "united democratic South Africa based on the will of the people..'.. 4 This was the
cornerstone of the UDF Declaration (the "Declaration").
The Declaration affirmed the Charter principle that all
South Africans have a right to participate in the governing of
the country. The document condemns the new South African
constitution in these terms: "We say NO to the Republic of
South Africa Constitution Bill, a bill which will create vet another undemocratic constitution in the country of our

birth.'"105
The UDF Declaration recites the evils of a modified
apartheid regime and affirms a resolve to reject the entire
apartheid heritage, however packaged. The UDF is a non-violent political umbrella group that has affirmed the substantive
principles of the Freedom Charter, which explicitly endorses
the principle of non-violence as a strategy of change."" In
other words, while they share the common goals of, for example, the ANC, as reflected in the Freedom Charter, they do not
share the commitment to violent modes of political action to
secure the demise of apartheid. The UDF Declaration does
not mention one word about nationalization or the take-over
of private enterprise and vested economic interests. Indeed,
102. R:i,. OF S. AFR. CONsr. Au" 110 oi, 1983, Proc. 119 ((

9308.

pt. 6,§ 67.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See supra note 101.
UDF Declaration, supra note 56, relntIn/ed iq/la, appendix B.
Id.
See Freedom Charter, sula note 55, re/rin ed il/ia, appendix A.
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the Declaration is free from the usual anti-colonial, anti-imperialist language. This, I suspect, has the advantage of blunting
the communist bogie as an excuse for repression and gives a
measure of clarity about what is wrong and what needs to be
done. In much the same way as the leadership responsible for
the promulgation of the Freedom Charter, the UDF leadership
has been hounded, persecuted, and repressed. Once more a
major treason trial, lasting years, secured the conviction for
high treason of these non-violent leaders. 117
D. Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic Soulith Africa
More recently, the draft of a document entitled "Constitutional Guidelines For a Democratic South Africa" (the "Guidelines" or "Charter 88") was leaked to a British-based publication, Front File.'0 8 The ANC's Guidelines are a partial response
to the evolution of the constitutive process from the perspective of the nationalist party. They are also in part a response to
the escalating condition of instability within South Africa and
with expectations among blacks that constitutive expectations
reflective of an alternative to the paradigm of apartheid are
critical. Finally, the Guidelines are a response to the fact that
there are many influential whites, including Afrikaners, who
are disenchanted with the new Pretoria constitution and are
searching for alternatives that are realistic and workable in a
future post-apartheid South Africa.
The preamble statement to the Guidelines notes the immediate debt to the Freedom Charter: "The Freedom Charter
remains today unique as the only South African document of
its kind that adheres firmly to democratic principles as accepted throughout the world."'' 1.
107. See Laurence, supra note 69.
108. See Charter 88, supra note 57. 'prin/ed i/i/i, appendix C.
109. Id.; see also FUNDAMENTAl. Ricirrs (.\V. Bridge. 1). Lasok. 1).L. Perroti. &
R.D. Plender eds. 1973) (collection of essays outlining the basic principles of fundamental rights); HUMAN DIGNITY: TiH: INrERNATION.IZATION o1" HUMAN RI(IrTS (A.H.
Henkin ed. 1979); HUMAN Rcmirrs ANI) WORLD PULtIC ORDER.suprI
note 13. (general
discussion of international human rights). For an earlier work that seeks clarification
of the conception of the public interest that today can be jstifled as a ptblic order
and a constitutive process that sustains human dignity on the largest possible scale.
see NoMos. Tin.: PUtIC INTEREST (CJ. Friedrich ed. 1962). For other works on the
subject, see Weston, lukcs & Hnatt. Re4ional Human Rights Reim's: .1 ('noparison an0d
.-fpprt-isal. 20 VAND. J. IRANSNAI'l. L. 585 (1987).
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The Guidelines affirm the commitment to a "free, democratic and non-racial South Africa.''.. This goal is, today, fully
consonant with the major understandings and expectations of
the larger planetary community and demonstrates that more
and more expectations of the oppressed South African masses
for constitutional governance are fully consistent with the
mandate of international law and morality. Moreover, it acknowledges the fact, implicitly, that apartheid is criminal under
international law, as evidenced in the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid,"' and that in any event, the key policies and practices of apartheid are themselves crimes against humanity
under the law of the Nuremberg Tribunal, which now has the
2
status of customary international law.''
The preamble statement of the Guidelines addresses the
core policy questions that confront any radical reconstruction
of South Africa along the lines of contemporary expectations
of governance, accountability, fairness, and economic equity.
One of these is, for example, the South African heritage of discrimination and oppression as reflected in both law and social
practice. Here the preamble, in effect, hints at the salience of a
completely new paradigm, not just of governance but of thinking-a paradigm intrinsic to the notion of constitutional process:
The structures and institutions of apartheid must be dismantled and be replaced by democratic ones. Steps must
be taken to ensure that apartheid ideas and practices are not
permitted to appear in old or new forms.... The constitution must . ..promote the habits of non-racial and nonsexist thinking, the practice of anti-racist behaviour and the
3
acquisition of genuinely shared patriotic consciousness.''
What is envisioned here is obviously not simply the constitution as a disembodied-from-reality document, but indeed, a
constitutive process-a living-dynamic process about law-making and law application in a fundamental sense. A key point of
110. Charter 88, supra note 57. rpontd i/i'a. appendix C.
11.
I
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid, opened/for signalni Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N. I.S. 243 1hereinafter
Apartheid Convention].
112. Judgment of the Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 6 F.R,). 69 (1946).
113. Charter 88. snptii note 57. epi inted in!/in, appendix C.
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divergence from the 1955 Charter is the rejection of the constitutional protection of "group rights."''1 4 The idea is that the
privileged position of the white group may serve to preserve
the status quo with the "mass" of the people constitutionally
"trapped" in poverty. The Guidelines, however, do indicate
that the state "shall recognize the linguistic and cultural diversity of the people and provide facilities for free linguistic and
cultural development." ' 15 This seems to suggest that while the
principle that individual rights are the prime constitutional
sanction, carefully defined "group" rights are also licit. However, the language of the 1955 Charter is much more emphatic
about equal rights for national groups."' Indeed, the Guidelines recede -from this level of emphasis. Again, the roots of
this change may be the business of the balkanization of South
Africa through the Pretoria Bantustan program, "7 group areas
decrees,'
and the "groupness" and lack of individual rights
in the South African Constitution of 1983.'"
As indicated earlier, Charter 1988 is meant to be viewed
more from a constitutional point of view than the 1955 instrument. The framers of Charter 88 sought, in effect, to convert
the vision of the 1955 Charter into a "constitutional reality."
However, this instrument-as I have tried to show-is a part of
a process of law-in-the-making, a kind of living law about black
constitutional expectations. The 1988 version significantly
sharpens those expectations. The document covers ten broad
themes: the state, franchise, national identity, bill of rights and
affirmative action, economy, land, workers, women, the family,
2
and international relations. '- 1
The organization of the state seems unexceptional. Charter 88 envisions an "independent, unitary, democratic and
non-racial state."' 2' ' The Guidelines contain an insistence that
the organs of state administration and governance be repre114. Compare Freedom Charter. supra note 55. reprinted in/i'a,
appendix A with

Charter 88, spra note 57. repoiaed iira, appendix C.
115. See supra note 114.
116. The Freedom Charter states that "It lhere shall he equal status in the bodies of state, in the courts and in the schools for all national groups and races." Id.
117. See J. DIUGAu, . sil/n note I, at 188.
118. Id. at 80.
119. Seersllna note 101.

120. Charter 88. supn
121. 1I.

note 57. reprinled m/iw. appendix C.
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sentative of the people and that their function be to protect
and enhance the constitution.' 2 2 Sovereignty (authority) reposes in "the people as a whole"' 12 :" and in the exercise of sov24
ereign rights, the franchise-the right to vote-is universal. 1
In another reversal of the South African tradition, all voters
have the right to run for elective office. 2' - In a culturally diverse and apartheid-fragmented society, the question of the
critical symbols of loyalty looms large. Charter 88 stresses the
centrality of national identity and loyalty: "It shall be state policy to promote the growth of a single national identity and loyalty binding on all South Africans."'' 12 Since central elements
of the apartheid scheme were designed to balkanize national
identity along tribal lines through, inter alia, the creation of
such entities as the Transkei,t 27 it is apparent that the question
of national loyalty and the generation of inclusive symbols of
identity are of great importance. Indeed, even apart from the
ravages of apartheid, South Africa would still be a cultural and
linguistic entity of great diversity. It may be suggested that the
search for an inclusive unity in diversity by the ANC Guidelines
could be formulated in terms of a more internationalist, humanitarian idiom, so that the pattern of identification being
promoted involves a commitment to the symbol of human dignity as understood in contemporary international law under
the U.N. Charter, the International Bill of Rights,'12 ' and the
African (Banjul) Charter;'1' and further, these symbols could
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

126. Id.
127. The United Nations General Asscmblh Resolution onl the Transkei stated
that the Transkei was created in order to consolidate apartheid and perpetuate white
minority domination. G.A. Res. 31 16A. 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 10, U.N.
Doc. A/31/39 (1976). For an in-depth discussion of he Transkei. see G. CARrrER &
T. KARIS, Sourn AFRICA'S IRANSKEI (1967).
128. The following documents comprise what is knoo n as the International Bill
of Rights: Universal Declaration of Hunan Rights. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. 1)oc. A/810.
at 71 (1948); International Covenant on Economic. Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A. 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Do(-. A/6316
nahnl ltman, Righls
(1966); see Hassan, Solidari v' Rghts": logressivr'Evolntion on In/eri
L.aw?, I N.Y.I,. Scmt. HUM. Rwrs. ANN. 51 (1983).
129. Document CAB/l.EG/67/3/Rev. 5 of the Organization of African Unity.
.1/iri Con/ext (?/ ltimaln
For a commentary on the Afiican Charter, see Ake.
Rgh/s, 34 AFR. "'oDA-v 5 (1987).
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also be promoted as the core symbols of a more inclusive
South African nationhood. The advantage of such a strategem
is that South African nationhood may itself be identified with
the values of a more universal ethos-with mankind as a whole.
Indeed, the very next section in the document itself, under the
heading "Bill of Rights and Affirmative Action," indicates that
"[t]he Constitution shall include a Bill of Rights" that shall
"guarantee the fundamental human rights of all citizens, irrespective of race, colour, sex or creed ....
,,'
There is no
reason why South African identity and the national symbols of
loyalty should not unequivocally embrace the symbols of
human rights and human dignity. Anything less, in this
writer's view, would be a betrayal of the values for which African patriots have sacrificed themselves.
The Bill of Rights section refers to the norms of non-discrimination as well as of affirmative action as vehicles for securing a more just and equitable allocation of the valued things in
life.'"' As has been seen in the United States, affirmative action, when applied with prudence and determination, is a central element in the achievement of social justice for groups
with a long heritage of discrimination.13 2 Since social and economic justice will not be an overnight proposition, the constitutional status of affirmative action as a principle of social justice will be a key element in the post-apartheid legal order. It
should be noted, also, that affirmative action is fully consistent
with the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination.'
Another, perhaps controversial, guideline is the outlawing
of the "advocacy or practice of racism, fascism, and nazism or
the incitement of ethnic or regional exclusiveness or hatred
....
4 Since this principle is a limitation on the principle of
130. Charter 88. supra note 57, reprinted infra, appendix C.
131. Id.
132. See United ,Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (upholding New
York legislation reapportioning three New York City counties so as intentionally to
increase non-white majorities in certain districts); Swarn v. Charlotte-Mecklenbiirg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1971) (upholding use of racC-conscious pupil assignment to
remedy past intentional segregation).
133. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrinination. Mar. 7. 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter Convention on Racial Discrimination].
134. Charter 88, snpra note 57, reprinted infra, appendix C.
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free expression, there will certainly be those who will fear that
it may be abused. In a democracy, freedom of expression,
although concededly indispensable, is also frequently under
fire. Consequently, limitations on its exercise in a free society
should be grudgingly conceded. Here, perhaps, legislation defining more precisely what the operative terms mean may be
helpful in limiting the provision to the kinds of circumstances
it is genuinely intended to involve. Again, this provision is in
accord with the Convention on Racial Discrimination. 13 5 It
may be questioned why the advocacy of apartheid is not also
outlawed in the same provision, since apartheid is itself outlawed under customary international law IM as well as by the
import of the Apartheid Convention itself.1 3 7 The Bill of
Rights of the Guidelines does appear to be broader than those
conventionally found in such instruments and, therefore, provides fruitful grounds for discussion and negotiation for the
future. Freedom of association, thought, worship, and the
press, the right to work, education, and social security are all
part of the proposed constitutional Bill of Rights landscape.
Finally, there are some glaring and obvious omissions under
the Bill of Rights provisions. The document is silent on capital
punishment and torture.1 3 8 Since these institutions have been,
and are the cornerstone of the repressive apparatus of the Pretoria authorities, I would suggest that they be firmly and categorically abolished in a new constitutional order.
The Guidelines respecting economic matters significantly
sharpen earlier formulations about the role of law in determining basic economic expectations. The Guidelines state that the
economy is to serve the common interests of all and not simply
the special interests of the few."' The model of the economy
is described as mixed and envisions public, private, co-opera135. See Convention on Racial Discrimination. supra, note 133.
136. See Nagan, Judicial Executions U"nderAparthIeid: The Case of the Shaipville Six. 2
WITHoti PRlJU'DICE 61-71 (1988).
137. See Apartheid Convention, supra note I11.
138. Compare European Convention for the Prevention of lorture and Inhuman
or )egrading Treatment or Punishment, Nov. 26, 1987, Europ. I'.S. No. 126 with
Charter 88, snpra note 57, reprinted iqfia, appendix C (Charter 88 does not contain any
of the anti-toriture provisions set Forth in the Torture Convention). For an in-depth
discussion of the historical and legal implications of punishment and torture in South
Alrica, see 1).. FOSTFR, DETENTION ANDITORTURE IN SoITril AFRICA (1987).
139. Charter 88, supra note 57, reprinted infia, appendix C.
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tive, and small-scale family sectors. 4 ' Given South Africa's diverse populations and the complex levels of economic stratification that they represent, the Guidelines seek to "mix" both
the advanced industrial sectors with concerns for local and village-level development. Indeed, one might say that the provisions implyv a right-to-development goal for the impoverished
masses. For example, paragraph (R) holds that "[c]o-operative
forms of economic enterprise, village industries and 4 small
scale family activities shall be supported by the state." ''
It may be that these activities can also be successfully supported by a committed private sector (national and international). Again, the state's positive vote in training for various
important economic skills is acknowledged in Charter 88:
"The state shall promote the acquisition of managerial, technical and scientific skills among all sections of the population,
especially the blacks."' 4 2 Here again the private sector must
assume a significant role. Indeed it may be implied that for the
state to "promote" such economic outcomes means that the
state promotes these at every level of economic organization.
The last few themes in Charter 88 deal with land reform, a
charter of worker's rights, women's rights (which include affirmative action), family rights, and South Africa's international status as a non-aligned state committed to national liberation, world peace, and disarmament.
X. APPRAISAL
What do these documents and the processes behind them
represent? If we accept the proposition that law-making is (i) a
dynamic enterprise and (ii) not the exclusive monopoly of the
state, then we come to the conclusion that a national liberation
movement-in-exile, like the ANC, and an umbrella non-violent
movement within South Africa, like the UDF, although persecuted, are active agents in the dynamic processes of norm generation-or norm creation. Without norms we cannot have
prescription-law-making-in any operational sense. We then
come to the conclusion that informal groups and associations
operating in the national and international environment are
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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not only active agents in the process of effective power, they
are active law-making agents in an ongoing, though admittedly
fluid, constitutive process. The final point in this context is the
danger of dissociating the constitution (as a document) from
the "living" or behavioral constitutive process itself. The obvious danger of any group taking control of the South African
state is that the constitution, instead of generating a process
that honors the historically conditioned claims to human dignity,, may yield to the temptation of using the coercive state
apparatus to hijack the expectations of the people.
I suggest that all these documents, especially Charter 88,
would have to be supplemented by the understanding that (i)
law-making is dynamic and that it is not the exclusive monopoly of the state, (ii) informal groups and national liberation
movements should give attention to this phenomenon, and (iii)
human rights could be in jeopardy if the coercive apparatus of
the South African state is masked by a meaningless, hortatory
constitution, while power is perhaps hijacked and abused by
others. Thus, efforts should be made to institutionalize in
every available instance, the major purposes of the Charter
notwithstanding the continued existence of the apartheid state.
This would include, for example, matters like affirmative action
and leadership training.
I would also suggest two important guides to an improvement of the long-term prospects of an alternative law paradigm for South Africa. Important as it is to identify and codify
law at the bottom, it is also important to integrate into those
expectations law-making standards and processes consistent
with the principles of the U.N. Charter and with progressive
humanity.
It was Nelson Mandela who said in his early years that the
ANC had to "assess our situation in a global context."' 4 And
as we have earlier noted, the claims to self-determination and
independence of the South African people are indeed rooted
in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, the immediate precursor of the U.N. Charter. Viewed in this light, the living law of
human rights and liberation at the global level is a significant
143. N-. BENSON, NELSON MNINDEA:

a/so I. SOHN &
506, 507 (1973).
We

'.
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THE M.AN .\ND1'l,

MO'EMENI 216 (1986):
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element in principled and strategic goal guidance and an important supplement to the living law of the people of South
Africa.
One need only briefly canvass the framework of the International Bill of Rights, the principles codified in the NIEO and
now reflected in the so-called third generation of human
rights, to appreciate the breadth of vision of the modern
human rights outlook.' 4 4 I may also briefly refer to the African
Bill of Rights 4 ' and the proposed Arab Bill of Rights 4 6 as instruments suggestive of a constitutional order committed to a
broad conception of human dignity and respect. While Charter 88 seems to have capsuled many of these developments, a
fuller development of an alternative law paradigm requires a
much more systematic appreciation of the comprehensive
human rights agenda of the larger world community.
One last point needs to be mentioned. The law of liberation.and freedom requires a legal profession that will clarify
and implement principles of liberation and freedom in the
common interest. It may be a boon that so few of South Africa's black population have been trained for managerial roles
in the apartheid form of law and administration. But the challenge remains that a group of lawyers is needed-informed not
by the paradigm of the status quo but by the paradigm of liberation and international solidarity. This is a present challenge
of increasing urgency.
The speculations that I have ventured so far have ignored
a crucial issue of significant import to the future of law in
South Africa. The issue may be framed as follows: The character of the processes of transformation of South Africa may
themselves have a significant influence on the type of legal culture that might emerge in a post-apartheid society. Two possibilities might ensue. First, the more coercive the strategies of
transformation and change, the more coercive the new legal
order might be. Second, the less coercive the strategies of
transformation, the less coercive the new legal order might be.
144. For \various discussions of current human rights issues in Africa, see Bello,
The Ride o/ Law in .lIJica,30 INT'I. & COMI,. L.Q. 628 (1981); seralso
lHman, R htsls:
Nagan Address, supra note 40, ai 320-22; 32 AFR. TODA\Y (1984).
145. See supra note 128.
IIRI'RTER ON
146. INT'I. INST. o1, HIGH:R STr)IES IN CRIMINA.L SCIENCIS, I)RAV
HUMAN AND PEorii.s,:S Ri(;irrs IN Tili.ARAB WORLD (1987).
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To put these speculations into a practical context, the last section of this paper suggests potentials and challenges between
blacks and whites about the nature of the options for change
and the relevance of explicit reliance on the living law perspective-national, regional, and transnational-for a future South
African public order committed to the principle of human dignity.
THE STRUGGLE A.D THE FUTURE LEGAL ORDER:
CO.VCL L DING CONSIDERA TIONS
The political future of South Africa will ultimately have to
reflect core understandings about the allocation or distribution
of power. If these understandings are at all realistic, they will
be responsive to the bases of effective power that the key
power-brokers control. At present, Mr. Botha and his wing of
the national party are key power-brokers. Mr. Botha represents a shrinking constituency. However, that constituency has
a core that is difficult to penetrate with an agenda of fundamental change, let alone, mild, neo-apartheid reform.
Notwithstanding this historical impediment to change, this
constituency may experience further erosion when their representatives attempt to make strategic adjustments necessary to
the survival of white hegemony. A keener appreciation of
political reality may even require greater risks of constituency
erosion where accommodation and support for basic changes,
seen in mature reflection as realistic alternatives, mandate that
the ruling elite accommodate reality or assume unimaginable
costs.

A catastrophe for white South Africa can best be avoided
by a realistic cost assessment of the options by all enlightened
and thoughtful segments of that community.; One strategic option may be for whites, or as many of them as possible, to align
themselves in a coalition that might ultimately supersede and
possibly even effectively replace the Botha wing of the nationalist party as well as to secure the isolation of the verkrampte
elements 147 in the party and their lunatic-fringe allies. In any
147. Widiin ie Afrikancr nationalist party pcrspectivc, there have been two
loosely emergent wings. One wing is styled "vcrligte," meaning politically enfightened-either flexible about apartheid or willing to see its demise. The second wing
of the party has been loosely styled "verkramnpte." The "verkrampte'" range from the
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event, the white posture that should prove fruitful as a starting
point for negotiations is obvious: first, the principle that
apartheid must be eliminated, root and branch-a point conceded by most enlightened white South Africans including
many Afrikaners and second, that negotiations must take place
between the white representatives and real black leadership
and not the synthetic black leadership produced by the
apartheid machine. The basic starting points of negotiations
are not hard to imagine; they include conflicting claims to nationalism. On the white side is the extreme claim of Afrikaner
nationalism-a form of self-determination that means domination over everyone else. On the black side is the claim to majority rule, with the attendant classical fears that the majority
will abuse its position of power in its own self-interest.
Just as we see an identity of "ethic" interest among the
whites crumbling, so too it may be too large an assumption
that all blacks will coalesce around an identity of "ethnic" interest. If the principles of democratic political participation reflected in the major purpose of Charter 88 and the International Bill of Rights are honored to the highest degree, a black
democratic system based on the principle of majority rule does
not mean black domination. It will be recalled that white
power became unfettered, in part, because of the exclusion
originally of the Cape Africans and Cape coloureds from the
discriminatory patterns of drawing electoral districts and, fi48
nally, the emasculation of the courts.1
As a caution, it should be noted that the international law
principle of self-determination as majority rule is complemented by the emerging law of human -rights, which recognizes
both a "hard law" of civil and political rights and perhaps a
"soft law" of economic, social, and cultural rights. Self-determination that excludes the relevance of protecting and enhancing the claim of the individual to a concrete manifestation of
human dignity in the political, social, cultural, and religious
spheres is indeed a hollow right, and theories that advance the
principle of self-determination as a human right without reoutright fascist to rock-ribbed reactionary and tundamentallh believe that not only
should there be no deiation fromt aparthcid, but that apartheid law should be more
vigorously made and more vigorously applied.
148. See supra note I. See gepul'ah

H.J. SIMONS & R.E. SIMtONs, supra note 23.
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gard to the complementarity of rights that limit the principle of
self-determination within a contextual assessment of the meaning, relevance, and applicability of other human rights respecting individuals, is a sham claim. This is precisely the claim
Malan, Strijdom, Verwoerd, Voster, and perhaps Botha have
made on behalf of Afrikaner nationalism." 9 The realization of
this claim has not been freedom but domination and repression and has led to international censure of apartheid as a
crime against humanity.
The U.S. experience is relevant here. It is the oldest continuous political tradition that is explicitly based on the principle of limited government. The central policy question the
founders faced, and which successive generations of politicians
and lawyers have faced, is a simple one: What principles of
political and social morality are sacrificed at the altar of the
sovereign majority and what principles are "traded off"
against that process? Each political culture must ultimately put
some values beyond the reach of instant and ephemeral majorities. Each political culture must assess what is salient and crucial to its existence and to its capacity to live up to the fullest
expectations of hope that the United Nations Charter system
gives, namely, that the human dignity of every person whatever
the race, creed, or status be honored in the highest degree. A
new legal order informed by the heritage of the Atlantic Charter, the Freedom Charter, and Charter 88 has an impressive
pedigree from which to proceed, since the living law of liberation forces and the living and formal law of international
human rights are indispensable and complementary conditions
of a truly just society.
149. See gnerall)1B. BUNTING, sup/ra noic 10.
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APPENDIX A
The Freedom Charter*
The "Freedom Charter" was unanimously adopted at a
"Congress of the People", held in Kliptown, near Johannesburg, on 25 and 26 June, 1955.
The Congress was convened by the African National Congress (ANC), together with the South African Indian Congress,
the South African Coloured Peoples' Organization and the
Congress of Democrats (an organization of whites supporting
the liberation movement). It was attended by 2,888 delegates
from throughout South Africa, and was perhaps the most representative gathering ever held in the country.
The Charter was adopted by the four sponsoring organizations as their policy and became a manifesto of their struggle
for freedom.
A year later, 156 leaders of these organizations were arrested and charged with "treason". They were acquitted after
a trial lasting more than four years, but the ANC and the Congress of Democrats were soon banned, while the other two organizations were effectively prevented from legal operation by
the banning of their leaders.
THE FREEDOM CHARTER
We, the people of South Africa, declare for all our country and the
world to know:
-that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and
white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the people;
-that our people have been robbed of their birthright to land,
liberty and peace by a form of government founded on injustice and inequality;
-that our country will never be prosperous or free until all
our people live in brotherhood, enjoying equal rights and opportunities;
-that
*

only a democratic state, based on the will of all the peoReprinted From l'ik
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pie, can secure to all their birthright without distinction of colour, race, sex or belief;
And therefore, we the people of South Africa, black and
white together-equals, countrymen and brothers-adopt this
Freedom Charter. And we pledge ourselves to strive together,
sparing neither strength nor courage, until the democratic
changes set out here have been won.
The people shall govern!
Every man and woman shall have the right to vote for and
to stand as a candidate for all bodies which make laws;
All people shall be entitled to take part in the administration of the country;
The rights of the people shall be the same, regardless of
race, colour or sex;
All bodies of minority rule, advisory boards, councils and
authorities shall be replaced by democratic organs of self-government.
All national groups shall have equal rights!
There shall be equal status in the bodies of state, in the
courts and in the schools for all national groups and races;
All people shall have equal right to use their own languages, and to develop their own folk culture and customs;
All national groups shall be protected by law against insults to their race and national pride;
The preaching and practice of national, race or colour discrimination and contempt shall be a punishable crime;
The people shall share in the country's wealth!
All apartheid laws and practices shall be set aside. The
people shall share in the country's wealth!
The national wealth of our country, the heritage of all
South Africans, shall be restored to the people;
The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the
people as a whole;
• All other industry and trade shall be controlled to assist
the well-being of the people;
All people shall have equal rights to trade where they
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choose, to manufacture and to enter all trades, crafts and professions.
The land shall be shared among those who work it!
Restrictions of land ownership on a racial basis shall be
ended, and all the land redivided amongst those who work it,
to banish famine and land hunger;
The state shall help the peasants with implements, seed,
tractors and dams to save the soil and assist the tillers;
Freedom of movement shall be guaranteed to all who
work on the land;
All shall have the right to occupy land wherever they
choose;
People shall not be robbed of their cattle, and forced labour and farm prisons shall be abolished.
All shall be equal before the.law!
No one shall be imprisoned, deported or restricted without a fair trial;
No one shall be condemned by the order of any government official;
The courts shall be representative of all the people;
Imprisonment shall be only for serious crimes against the
people, and shall aim at re-education, not vengeance;
The police force and army shall be opened to all on an
equal basis and shall be the helpers and protectors of the people;
All laws which discriminate on grounds of race, colour or
belief shall be repealed.
All shall enjoy equal human rights!
The law shall guarantee to all their rights to speak, to organize, to meet together, to punish, to preach, to worship and
to educate their children;
The privacy of the house from police raids shall be protected by law;
All shall be free to travel without restriction from countryside to town, from province to province and from South Africa
abroad;
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Pass laws, permits, and all other laws restricting these
freedoms, shall be abolished.
There shall be work and security!
All who work shall be free to form unions, to elect their
officers and to make wage agreements with their employers;
The state shall recognise the right and duty of all to work,
and to draw full unemployment benefits;
Men and women of all races shall receive equal pay for
equal work;
There shall be a forty-hour working week, a national minimum wage, paid annual leave, and sick leave for all workers,
and maternity leave on full pay for all working mothers;
Miners, domestic workers, farm workers, and civil servants
shall have the same rights as all others who work;
Child labour, compound labour, the tot system and contract labour shall be abolished.
The doors of learning and of culture shall be opened!
The government shall discover, develop and encourage
national talent for the enhancement of our cultural life;
All the cultural treasures of mankind shall be open to all,
by free exchange of books, ideas and contact with other lands;
The aim of education shall be to teach the youth to love
their people and their culture, to honour human brotherhood,
liberty and peace;
Education shall be free, compulsory, universal and equal
for all children;
Higher education and technical training shall be opened
to all by means of state allowances and scholarships awarded
on the basis of merit;
Adult illiteracy shall be ended by a mass state education
plan;
Teachers shall have all the rights of other citizens;
The colour bar in cultural life, in sport and in education
shall be abolished;
There shall be houses, security and comfort!
All people shall have the rights to live where they choose,
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to be decently housed, and to bring up their families in comfort, and security;
Unused housing space shall be made available to the people;
Rent and prices shall be lowered, food plentiful and no
one shall go hungry;
A preventive health scheme shall be run by the state;
Free medical care and hospitalisation shall be provided for
all, with special care for mothers and young children;
Slums shall be demolished, and new suburbs built where
all have transport, roads, lighting, playing fields, cr&ches and
social centres;
The aged, the orphans, the disabled and the sick shall be
cared for by the state;
Rest, leisure, and recreation shall be the right of all;
Fenced locations and ghettoes shall be abolished, and laws
which break up families shall be repealed;
South Africa shall be a fully independent state, which respects the rights and sovereignty of nations:
There shall be peace and friendship!
South Africa shall strive to maintain world peace and the
settlement of all international disputes by negotiation-not
war;
Peace and friendship amongst all our people shall be secured by upholding the equal rights, opportunities and status
of all;
The people of the protectorates-Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland-shall be free to decide for themselves
their own future;
The rights of all the peoples of Africa to independence
and self-government shall be recognised, and shall be the basis
of close cooperation;
Let all who love their people and their country now say, as
we say here:
'These freedoms we will fight for, side by side, throughout our
lives, until we have won our liberty.'
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APPENDIX B
The UDF Declaration

*

WE THE FREEDOM LOVING PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA
SAY WITH ONE VOICE TO THE WHOLE WORLD THAT
WE
cherish the vision of a united democratic South Africa based
on the will of the people, will strive for the unity of all our
people through united action against the evils of apartheid,
economic and all other forms of exploitation.
We stand for the creation of a true democracy in which all
South Africans will participate in the government of our country;
We stand for a single non-racial, unfragmented South Africa.
A South Africa free of Bantustans and Group Areas;
We say, all forms of oppression and exploitation must end. In
accordance with these noble ideals and on this 20th day of August 1983, at Rocklands Civic Centre, Mitchell's Plain, we join
hands as community, women's, students, religious, sporting
and other organisations and trade unions, to say no to
apartheid.
We say NO to the Republic of South Africa Constitution Bill, a
bill which will create yet another undemocratic constitution in
the country of our birth.
We say NO to the Koornhof Bills which will deprive more and
more African people of their birthright,
We say YES to the birth of the United Democratic Front on
this historic day.
WE KNOW THAT
this government is determined to break the unity our people,
but our people will face greater hardships, that our people living in racially segregated and relocated areas will be cut off
from the wealth they produce in the cities. That rents and
other basic charges will increase. And, that our living standards will fall;
that working people will be divided urban from rural; employed from unemployed, men from women. Low wages, poor
working conditions, attacks on our trade unions will continue;
* Reprinted from liver printed by tile
United Democratic Front.
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students will continue to suffer under unequal education, created to supply a reservoir of cheap labour. Ethnic control and
unequal facilities will remain. Apartheid will still be felt in our
classrooms.
The religious and cultural life of our people will be harmed.
The sins of apartheid will continue to be stamped on the culture and religions of our people;
The oppression and exploitation of women will continue. Women will suffer greater hardships under the new pass laws.
Women will be divided from their children and families. Poverty and malnutrition will continue to disrupt family life. The
brunt of apartheid will still be carried by our families; non-racial sport will suffer. There will be less money for the building
of sports facilities. And, forced separation will deal non-racial
sport a further blow.
WE KNOW THAT APARTHEID WILL' CONTINUE that
white domination and exploitation will continue; that forced
removals, the Group Areas Act and the Bantustans will remain.
WE KNOW that there will not be an end to the unequal distribution of the land, wealth and resources of the countrv. That
the migratory labour system will live on to destroy family life.
We KNOW that the government will always use false leaders to
become its junior partner and control us. Our lives will still be
filled with fears of harassment, bannings, detentions and
death.
Mindful of the fact that the new Constitutional Proposals and
Koornhof measures will further entrench apartheid and white
domination.
And in our march to a free and just South Africa, we commit
ourselves to uniting all our people wherever they may be in the
cities and countrysides, the factories and mines, schools, colleges and universities, housing and sports fields, churches,
mosques and temples, to fight for our freedom.
We therefore resolve to stand shoulder to shoulder in our
common struggle and commit ourselves to
WORK TOGETHER TO
organise and mobilise all community, worker, student, women,
religious, sporting and other organisations under the banner
of the United Democratic Front;
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consult our people regularly and honestly and bravely, and
strive to represent their views and aspirations.
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The Freedom Charter-1988 Version*

The Freedom Charter, adopted in 1955 by the Congress of the
People at Kliptown, near Johannesburg, was the first systematic statement in the history of our country of the political and
constitutional vision of a free, democratic and non-racial South
Africa.
The Freedom Charter remains today unique as the only South
African document of its kind that adheres firmly to democratic
principles as accepted throughout the world. Amongst South
Africans it has become by far the most widely accepted programme for a post-apartheid country. The stage is now approaching where the Freedom Charter must be converted from
a vision of the future into a constitutional reality.
We in the African National Congress submit to the people of
South Africa, and to all those throughout the world who wish
to see an end of apartheid, our basic guidelines for the foundations of government in a post-apartheid South Africa. Extensive and democratic debate on these guidelines will mobilise
the widest sections of our population to achieve agreement on
how to put an end to the tyranny and oppression under which
our people live, thus enabling them to lead normal and decent
lives as free citizens in a free country.
The immediate aim is to create a just and democratic society
that will sweep away the country's old legacy of colonial conquest and white domination, and abolish all laws imposing racial oppression and discrimination. The removal of discriminatory laws and eradication of all vestiges of the illegitimate
regime are, however, not enough. The structures and institutions of apartheid must be dismantled and be replaced by democratic ones. Steps must be taken to ensure that apartheid
ideas and practices are not permitted to appear in old or new
forms.
In addition, the effects of centuries of racial domination and
inequality must be overcome by constitutional provisions for
corrective action which guarantees a rapid and irreversible redistribution of wealth and opening up of facilities to all. The
* Reprinted from Frcedom Charter-1988 Version in .- VI.\' Past Post-..Ip(rlhid
'(;uideli, s'-A-Y, Front File, Aug. 1988, at 1.
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constitution must also be such as to promote the habits of
non-racial and non-sexist thinking, the practice of anti-racist
behaviour and the acquisition of genuinely shared patriotic
consciousness.
The constitution must give firm protection to the fundamental
human rights of all citizens. There shall be equal rights for all
individuals irrespective of race, colour, sex or creed. In addition, the constitution must entrench equal cultural, linguistic
and religious rights for all.
Under the conditions of contemporary South Africa, 87% of
the land and 95% of the instruments of production are in the
hands of the ruling class, which is drawn solely from the white
community. It follows, therefore, that constitutional protection for group rights would perpetuate the status quo and
would mean that the mass of the people continue to be constitutionally trapped in poverty and remain as outsiders in the
land of their birth.
Finally, the efficacy of the constitution will, to a large extent be
determined by the degree to which it promotes conditions for
the active involvement of all sectors of the population at all
levels in government and in the economic and cultural life.
Bearing these fundamental objectives in mind, we declare that
the elimination of apartheid and the creation of a truly just and
democratic South Africa requires a constitution based on the
following principles:
THE STATE
(A) South Africa shall be an independent, unitary, democratic and non-racial state.
(B) Sovereignty shall belong to the people as a whole and
shall be exercised through. oie central legislature, executive,
judiciary and administration.
Provision shall be made for the delegation of the powers
of the central authority to subordinate administrative units for
purposes of more efficient administration and democratic participation.
(C) The institution ofhereditary rulers and chiefs shall be
transformed to serve the interests of the people as a whole in
conformity with the democratic principles embodied in the
constitution.

(D)

All organs of government, including justice, security and
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armed forces, shall be representative of the people as a whole,
democratic in their structure and functioning, and dedicated to
defending the principles of the constitution.
FRANCHISE
(E) In the exercise of their sovereignty, the people shall have
the right to vote under a system of universal suffrage based on
the principle of one person/one vote.
(F) Ever [sic] voter shall have the right to stand for election
and to be elected to all legislative bodies.
NATIONAL IDENTITY
(G) It shall be state policy to promotethe growth of a single
national identity and loyalty binding on all South. Africans. At
the same time, the state shall recognise the linguistic and cultural diversity of the people and provide facilities for free linguistic and cultural development.
BILL OF RIGHTS AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION'
(H) The Constitution shall include a Bill of Rights based on
the Freedom Charter. Such a Bill of Rights shall guarantee the
fundamental human rights of all citizens, irrespective of race,
colour, sex or creed, and shall provide appropriate mechanisms for their protection and enforcement.
(I) The state and all social institutions shall be under a constitutional duty to eradicate race discrimination in all its forms.
(J) The state and all social institutions shall be under a constitutional duty to take active steps to eradicate, speedily, the economic and social inequalities produced by racial discrimination.
(K) The advocacy or practice of racism, fascism, nazism or
the encitement of ethnic or regional exclusiveness or hatred
shall be outlawed.
(L) Subject to clauses (I) and (K) above, the democratic state
shall guarantee the basic rights and freedoms such as freedom
of association, thought, worship and the press.
Furthermore, the state shall have the duty to protect the
right to work'and guarantee the right to education and social
security.
(M) All parties which conform to the provision of (I) to (K)
above shall have the legal right to exist and to take part in the
political life of the country.
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ECONOMY
(N) The state shall ensure that the entire economy serves the
interests and well-being of the entire population.
(0) The state shall have the right to determine the general
context in which economic life takes place and define and limit
the rights and obligations attaching to the ownership and use
of productive capacity.
(P) The private sector of the economy shall be obliged to cooperate with the state in realising the objectives of the Freedom Charter in promoting social well-being.
(Q) The economy shall be a mixed one, with a public sector,
a private sector, a co-operative sector and a small-scale family
sector.
(R) Co-operative forms of economic enterprise, village industries and small scale family activities shall be supported by
the state.
(S) The state shall promote the acquisition of managerial,
technical and scientific skills among all sections of the population, especially the blacks.
(T) Property for personal use and consumption shall be constitutionally protected.
LAND
(U) The state shall devise and implement a land reform programme that will include and address the following issues:
-Abolition of all racial restrictions on ownership and use
of land.
-Implementation of land reform in conformity with the
principle of affirmative action, taking into account the status of
victims of forced removals.
WORKERS
(V) A charter protecting workers' trade union rights, especially the right to strike and collective bargaining, shall be incorporated into the constitution.
WOMEN
(W) Women shall have equal rights in all spheres of public
and private life and the state shall take affirmative action to
eliminate inequalities and discrimination between the sexes.
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THE FAMILY
(X) The family, parenthood and children's rights shall be
protected.
INTERNATIONAL
(Y) South Africa shall be a non-aligned state committed to
the principles of the Charter of the Organisation of African
Unity and the Charter of the United Nations and to the
achievement of national liberation, world peace and disarmament.

